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Abstract: Conventional dual-rail precharge logic suffers from difficult implementations of dual-rail structure for obtaining strict 
compensation between the counterpart rails. As a light-weight and high-speed dual-rail style, balanced cell-based dual-rail logic 
(BCDL) uses synchronised compound gates with global precharge signal to provide high resistance against differential power or 
electromagnetic analyses. BCDL can be realised from generic field programmable gate array (FPGA) design flows with 
constraints. However, routings still exist as concerns because of the deficient flexibility on routing control, which unfavourably 
results in bias between complementary nets in security-sensitive parts. In this article, based on a routing repair technique, novel 
verifications towards routing effect are presented. An 8 bit simplified advanced encryption processing (AES)-co-processor is 
executed that is constructed on block random access memory (RAM)-based BCDL in Xilinx Virtex-5 FPGAs. Since imbalanced 
routing are major defects in BCDL, the authors can rule out other influences and fairly quantify the security variants. A series of 
asymptotic correlation electromagnetic (EM) analyses are launched towards a group of circuits with consecutive routing schemes 
to be able to verify routing impact on side channel analyses. After repairing the non-identical routings, Mutual information 
analyses are executed to further validate the concrete security increase obtained from identical routing pairs in BCDL. 
1 Introduction 
Modern field programmable gate array (FPGA) devices offer 
rich configurable resource to implement application-specific 
digital systems. As one of the major applications, 
crypto-algorithms in FPGAs may benefit from the lower 
implementation costs when compared with application 
specific integrated circuit (ASIC) solutions, and the 
convenience of including them as sub-modules inside 
systems for data protection. Users can adjust the algorithm 
keys or implementation manners with sufficient flexibility 
to adapt them to different usages. Considering security, 
crypto-algorithms implemented in FPGAs do not expose 
structural details of the design, because of the regularity of 
how its internal logic is arranged. Owing to these features, 
FPGAs have become attractive platforms for cryptographic 
applications. 
Since side channel attacks (SCAs) were proposed by 
Kocher et al. in [1], data security threats in digital systems 
lurks beneath the protections features offered by modern 
cryptographic algorithms. However, these microprocessors, 
ASIC or FPGA implemented crypto-algorithms have been 
proven to be vulnerable facing side channel threats because 
of the 'side channel leakages' typically as the EM and 
power consumption produced during operations [2-4]. This 
exploitable information is unintentionally emanated from 
the atomic logic elements. Once a proper prediction matrix 
is constructed, the leak amount for specific algorithm points 
can be estimated. Hence, by making dependency 
comparison between the hypothetical leakage and the 
measured side channel leakage, the crypto-key or other 
confidential information, can be possibly retrieved within a 
short computation time. Compared with the pure 
algorithmic cryptanalyses, SCA reveals the secrets by 
means of the correlation analysis on physical leakage from 
intermediate logic points during operation. Therefore it 
requires less computing capabilities and an acceptable 
analysis time. Additionally, leakage information can be 
sneakily or remotely gathered from the target devices, 
without intervening the algorithm function, it poses more 
serious threats since it cannot be detected and counteracted 
by traditional defence strategies. Fig. 1 shows a typical 
setup of EM-based SCA platform, which normally consists 
of: (i) a target crypto-device; (ii) an EM antenna for 
measuring the EM radiation from the running device; (iii) 
an oscilloscope to gather and transfer the EM leakage; and 
(iv) a computation facility to execute correlation analysis 
for retrieving the secrets. 
Countering strategies against SCA threats have been 
widely discussed in previous papers. Possible leak points 
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Fig. 1 Example of setup scheme for EM side channel analysis 
are scattered inside a system from the internal logic elements 
to the external connectors, such as pin and on-board soldering 
metal. However, leak source is innately from circuit's 
fundamental physical cells, that is, transistors and routings. 
Thus, direct protections on atomic gate-level generally 
perform better than the algorithmic protections. According 
to the published works, the studied gate-level 
countermeasures can be categorised as 'masking' and 
'hiding'. 
Masking [5, 6] refers to the use of random mask to 
camouflage critical data that need to be protected. Since the 
masks used in this protection are random and unknown to 
the adversaries, the intermediate logic values are not able to 
be predicted. Therefore the dependence between the 
hypothetical leakage and measured traces cannot be 
correlated. However, further researches have revealed that 
masks can be removed by probability density analyses [7, 
8]. Another masking way is to generate noise to submerge 
the exploitable variants, yet, it can be defeated simply by 
increasing the number of analysed traces. 
Differently, hiding protection approaches flatten the 
data-dependent variants that can be exploited by differential 
analysis. It consists on adopting a dual-rail precharge logic 
(DPL) strategy, in which a generated false (F) rail works 
simultaneously together with the original true (T) rail for 
compensating with each other in power or EM behaviours 
[9, 10]. DPL is controlled using a two-phase protocol 
('precharge and evaluation'). During precharge phase, all 
the values of non-register cells are reset to a fixed state ('0' 
or ' 1 ' in a few cases), whereas evaluation phase switches 
and propagates valid values from each register to the next 
register stage. These two phases work alternately with a 
fixed switching frequency. This protocol theoretically 
ensures a non-discernible and constant switch manner, and 
therefore dynamically flattens side channel leakage emitted 
by the overall system in view of the dual rails. However, 
the increased security comes at the expense of power, area 
and complexity, depending on the specific logic styles. 
Besides the theoretical assumptions, security of 
implementation in FPGAs is crippled by the imbalanced 
parasitic capacitances, induced by routing differences in the 
T/F signal pair. Let us assume that a pair of net(¿) and net 
(f) have a parasitic capacitance C(t) and C(f), respectively. 
Owing to the routing variants, C(t) / C(f), (e.g. C(t) > C 
(f)). The charged energy E(t)-C(t) is different from the 
charged energy E(f)-C(f). Thus, during the transition from 
precharge phase to evaluation phase, consumed power for 
this net pair is bigger when net(¿) is ' 1 ' and net(/") is '0', 
and smaller if vice versa. This mismatch impairs the perfect 
compensation for the DPLs in side channel leakage. 
Routing effects on FPGA implemented DPL have been 
investigated in [11, 12]. In those works, authors have found 
that if the corresponding instances are closely placed 
side-by-side, similar routing paths can be obtained albeit 
using vendor provided routers. However, only 
approximately similar shapes can be achieved for the T/F 
pair, but not identical dual-rail networks. This pitfall still 
endangers the security assurance facing sophisticated side 
channel analyses. 
In this article, we aim to have verifications of the routing 
impact for a secure balanced cell-based dual-rail logic 
(BCDL) [13] implemented AES core with strict dual-rail 
networks. This work depends on two properties: 
• Low fan-out (block RAM [14] implemented) BCDL logic 
[15] resists side channel analysis on a higher level (e.g. free of 
glitch/early propagation effect (EPE) and reduced networks) 
with respect to most of other SCA-resistant logic styles. 
The major defect of block random access memory (BRAM) 
BCDL comes from the routing bias between T/F networks 
that cause imperfect compensation between each net pair. 
• The routing repair tool provided in a previous work [16] is 
able to partially repair the routings from security-sensitive 
parts to achieve identical net pairs. Since BCDL is immune 
from most side channel security defects, it is possible to 
obtain sophisticated security comparisons, exclusively 
focusing on routing parts. 
In the experiments provided in this work, a series of 
correlation EM analyses (CEMA) attacks are executed to 
figure out the routing impact against correlation analyses. 
Mutual information analyses (MIA) is further adopted in 
order to validate the security increase after the routing 
repair work. Moreover, timing analyses show greatly 
reduced time skew compared with previous constrained 
dual-rail routing methods [11] to stabilise the results 
obtained in previous real attacks. To the best of our 
knowledge, it is the first published initiative to date 
exploring the routing impact based on an EPE-free [17, 18] 
dual-rail logic with strictly identical networks. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. 
Section 2 discusses the background of SCA-resistant DPLs 
and secure BCDL styles. Section 3 elaborates the routing 
barrier in dual-rail system and details the repair work to 
BCDL implemented crypto-core. A series of security 
experiments are executed, and results are shown in Section 
4. Finally, Section 5 gives the conclusions and perspectives 
for future work. 
2 Background and related work 
2.1 Dual-rail precharge style 
Based on the principle of 'dynamic compensation', a number 
of dual-rail logic styles have been devised for counteracting 
side channel threats and the flaws that exist in many 
SCA-resistance logic styles. 
SCA-targeted dual-rail logic was first proposed in [9] as 
wave dynamic differential logic (WDDL) based on the 
principle of 'dynamic compensation'. In this technique, 
each single gate in the original circuit is replaced by a 
compound gate which has a pair of complementary T and F 
gates. A special signal is used to reset the gate outputs to 
the precharge state during the precharge phase. Yet, the 
compound gate in WDDL cannot assure identical routing 
for the true and false rails, which triggers exploitable side 
channel leakages [6]. Another logic, named masked DPL 
(MDPL) [19], combines the ideas of WDDL and 
bit-masking to randomly swap the logic interconnect pairs 
by majority functions. This helps to obtain a circuit 
insensitive to routing imbalance, however the power density 
function is potentially of removing the mask [7] by 
analysing subsets of the measured traces. Double WDDL 
presented in [12] uses another WDDL to compensate the 
routing bias, but the resource cost must be further doubled 
as well. The suspicious weakness against localised EM 
measurements also exists. 
2.2 Early propagation pitfall 
Early evaluation, or called EPE, was first put forward in [17]. 
A typical gate in ASIC or look-up table (LUT) in FPGA has 
one or more input nets. It is very likely that a gate has 
different arrival time between each input if no special 
constraint is adopted to the routing scheme. A critical 
problem because of this result is that the switch time for 
this gate may differ, or a glitch may occur, according to the 
combination of the input values, while switching between 
phases. Since the switch time or the glitch is related to the 
gate input combination, the minor variants induced in 
power or EM characteristic is data-dependent, and therefore 
can possibly be exploited by sophisticated side channel 
measurements. 
In previous contributions, some logic styles have been 
devised straightforward to overcome EPE. Dual-rail random 
switching logic proposed in [20] guarantees synchronised 
arrival time before the evaluation phase, yet not before the 
precharge phase. Seclib [21] resists EPE in nature, but was 
just for ASICs, secure triple track logic (STTL) [22] uses a 
third rail as the validation signal to synchronise the inputs. 
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However, the gate type is pretty unique and cannot be 
implemented easily. iMDPL [23] is a corrected version of 
MDPL to resynchronise all the inputs by inserting 
SR-latches. However, the increased complexity is a big 
concern. Precharge absorbed (PA) PA-DPL introduced in 
[24] has big decrease of resource cost by absorbing the 
precharge logic into the LUT itself. Since it is evolved from 
simple dynamic differential logic (SDDL) style and avoids 
of swapped T/F rails, PA-DPL can achieve symmetric 
dual-rail networks both in separate and interleaved 
placement [24, 25], whereas, further investigation reveals 
that EPE cannot be fully prevented from the second LUT 
stage in its combinatorial parts. iWDDL [26] is proposed 
based on the conclusion in [27] that short combinational 
path reduces less occurrence of EPE. The extra registers 
inserted into the combinational path is a big cost however. 
DPL-noEE [28] resists EPE by the special LUT encoding 
functions, without using extra synchronisation signals. 
However, the routing bias has not yet been eliminated as well. 
2.3 Low fan-out BCDL 
BCDL [15] is a DPL countermeasure specially designed for 
securing implementations of crypto-systems in FPGAs. The 
main advantage of BCDL is achieved by a global 
synchronisation signal named precharge (PRE). A BCDL 
cell is split into two stages (Fig. 2 - left). The first stage or 
the 'synchronisation stage' is responsible for synchronising 
all input signals before being processed. The second stage 
or the 'data stage' performs the required logical operations. 
Timing diagram of a BCDL cell is described in Fig. 2 -
right. The global synchronisation signal PRE is faster than 
data signals, since it is routed through high-speed clock 
buffers of the FPGA. During the precharge phase, the 
BCDL cell is forced to precharge state instantly without 
waiting for data signals. During evaluation, the second 
stage produces an output only when all the inputs are valid 
and PRE is ' 1 ' . A BCDL cell can be imagined as a master 
slave configuration where the synchronisation stage behaves 
as a master, which enables the data stage. 
Modern FPGAs provide various features which may 
benefit secure crypto-system implementations. For instance, 
using the embedded block BRAM, complex functions like 
an AES substitution box can be easily implemented. In 
addition, configurable logic block (CLB) in Xilinx series 
can efficiently implement a two-stage BCDL cell at 
minimum overhead [13]. Thus, Virtex-5 family possess 
LUT6 which can be used as one 6-input 1-output LUT or 
two 5-input 1-output LUT. Similarly, Stratix-II has adaptive 
look-up table (ALUT) which is capable of implementing 
two 5-input 1-output LUT, if two or more inputs are 
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common. A whole 2-input BCDL cell with true and false 
outputs may be therefore synthesised in a single LUT6-2 or 
ALUT, that is, a single LUT is calculating the true and the 
false outputs. Such configuration helps in making a 
compact design while reducing mismatch between the true 
and false networks. As in most of other DPL styles, BCDL 
also has two flip-flop stages. The main characteristics of 
using a global signal PRE are: 
1. PRE with the synchronisation stage counteracts EPE. 
2. PRE forces the precharge phase which removes the 
constraint of using only positive gates (gate without inverter 
factor in its function [9]), hence low cost. 
3. Since PRE is faster than other signals, the precharge phase 
can be made faster which results in higher throughputs. 
4. PRE is used to synchronise (enable) input addresses of 
memories which allows using BRAM in DPL. 
Let us take the example of a substitution box (S-box) in 
symmetric ciphers, such as the AES. An AES S-box is an 
8 >—• 8 bit bijection, defined as y >—• j _ 1 in GF(2)[x]/x8 + x4 
+ x3 + x + 1 i f j / 0 or 0 otherwise. Such a module will 
have a high fan-out when implemented in glue logic. 
Therefore BRAM is a popular choice to implement such 
S-boxes. In DPL, there are several approaches to duplicate 
the S-boxes. The first way is costly which involves a simple 
duplication of the RAM. This means that an AES S-box 
which fits in 28 x 8 bits (2 kB) needs 216 x 16 bits (1 MB) 
after duplication. In a parallel AES implementation, there 
are 16 instances of the same S-box, that is, 16 Mb of 
BRAM is needed. Medium size FPGA might not have these 
many BRAM resources and therefore would make the 
implementation infeasible. 
The second way to use BRAM in DPL is based on 
deployment of a special circuitry at the output to enable 
dual-rail operation. As shown in Fig. 3 - left, an AES 
S-box is replaced by a true and false S-box of size 28 x 8. 
Thereafter, a couple of AND gates are used to precharge 
the output of the S-boxes. The net overhead of this solution 
stays a little over two. However, this low-cost 
implementation (in Fig. 3 - left) is vulnerable to glitches 
and the input of AND gate can leak information if not 
implemented properly. Moreover, special routing resources 
are required to route the the precharge signal to the output 
of the RAM. Since the precharge signal is only used at the 
DPL gate inputs, routing precharge signal may require extra 
efforts. Thus in other DPL styles, using BRAM without 
glitches will have an exponential area overhead. 
The use of BRAM in BCDL is possible because of the 
presence of a global synchronisation signal PRE. An AES 
S-box in BCDL needs 29 x 8 bits (4 kB) of memory for 
S-boxT and 4 kB for S-boxF (Fig. 3 - right). It is because 
of the global synchronisation signal that the memory 
utilisation is increased by 2" + 2 and not 22". The cost can 
be further reduced to 2" + by using certain BRAM features 
[29]. 
We refer interested reader to [13, 15] for further details on 
BCDL. In [30], authors have demonstrated that the security of 
BCDL can be further enhanced by using low fan-out cells in 
the circuit. Complex cryptographic algorithms like AES rely 
substitution and diffusion function for security. Therefore it 
is difficult to provide identical placement and routing to the 
corresponding gate in the false part which causes routing 
imbalance. Timing imbalance is also increased with high 
fan-out. It can be roughly expressed as AT=KxF, where K 
is the constant capacitance and F is the fan-out. 
Scale of fan-out can be reduced by using BRAM. Once 
used as read-only memories BRAM can make up for 
complex unstructured or structured high algebraic degree 
combinational blocks, keeping an unitary fan-out. Such a 
module will have high fan-out when implemented in glue 
logic. Therefore BCDL using BRAM is better for FPGA 
implemented DPL logic in terms of cost, speed and 
particularly security. 
2.4 Attack metrics 
We use two SCA tools in our analysis. The first tool is CEMA 
which is similar to correlation power analysis (CPA) [30] 
proposed by Brier et al. Correlation analysis is a 
computation of the Pearson correlation coefficient between 
the side channel leakage L and the leakage model Z, which 
can be estimated as 
CPA: p(Z,, Z) £i«=oift-/
Ai)(z/-/Az) (1) 
where a and ¡i denote the standard deviation and the mean, 
respectively, and n is the traces count. The CEMA is 
efficient when L and Z are linearly related. Otherwise, the 
MIA ([31]) is a more appropriate tool as it is agnostic in 
the joint distribution (L; Z). Mutual information between a 
sensitive variable Z and a side channel leakage L, measured 
in bits is 
MIA:/(L; Z) = H(L) - H(L\Z) (2) 
Here, H{L) gives the entropy in bits of L and H{L\Z) gives the 
conditional entropy of L knowing Z Many methods have 
been proposed to estimate entropy like histograms, kernel 
density functions, Gaussian parametric estimators etc. [32], 
In the experimental work provided in this work, Gaussian 
parametric estimation is used, where the distribution of L, Z 
and the joint distribution (L; Z) are assumed to be 
Gaussian. This method might not be ideal for estimating 
entropy, but works well in practice [32] mainly because of 
the presence of environmental noise. Nevertheless, other 
methods of estimating entropy can be applied. For instance, 
using Gaussian parametric estimation, the entropy of a 
random variable X can be calculated as 
H(X) = - J2P(X{Í}) 1°SIP(XÍ) = loS2 (°"xV r^e) (3) 
Similar to the counterpart CPA, CEMA evolves from the 
original differential power analysis (DPA), and introduces a 
prediction matrix to estimate the states of certain 
intermediate logic points. This prediction depends on 
possible key hypotheses and some known information, such 
as a set of plaintexts or ciphertexts. Since CPA or CEMA is 
a multi-bit prediction, it efficiently exploits the information 
hidden inside the collected traces. So the correlation 
comparison fits better than the matrix used in DPA. 
3 Routing issues for symmetric dual-rail 
3.1 Routing obstacles in FPGA implementations 
Highly balanced dual-rail networks contribute to better 
dynamic power compensation. Closely deployed T and F 
nets increase resistance against carefully localised EM 
measurements. This is mainly due to the fact that the 
distance-sensitive EM fields from corresponding T and F 
nets induce matched voltage drops in the EM coil. 
However, implemented DPL is jeopardised by routing bias 
from three facts: (i) mainstream FPGAs just provide fixed 
routing resources. Users cannot freely place logic into a 
limited fabric area because of the lack of available routing 
resources; (ii) the routing paths cannot be controlled using 
vendor provided routers. So the routing lengths and shapes 
are not able to be predicted; and (iii) previously proposed 
copy and paste process is hindered by the potential routing 
conflicts. Thus, special solutions are needed which should 
be capable of fulfiling the two tasks: (a) provide extensive 
dual-rail routing control with proper constraints and (b) be 
capable of reserving the routing resources and prevent 
conflicts between different routings. 
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The duplication method has been used to achieve identical 
networks, where the designer copies the netlist of the original 
T rail and relocates it into non-occupied FPGA fabric. As just 
mentioned, resource conflicts are very likely to occur if the 
original T part and complementary F part are interleaved or 
closely located [16]. This fact is produced because the 
instance or net resource for F part may have already been 
occupied by previously mapped logic (logic corresponding 
to the T part or control and I/O block interconnects). One 
solution to alleviate the resource competition is to discreetly 
plan the placement in advance, for instance, previously 
reserving a space for deploying the instances of the F rail. 
As explained in Fig. 4, the resource for placing the F part 
may be reserved beforehand as prohibit region. Yet, on the 
contrary of the placement of logic instances which can be 
precisely controlled, routing conflicts remain unsolved 
because routing can still pass through this prohibit region. 
3.2 Identical routing techniques 
In [33], authors use dummy hard-macros to preoccupy the 
CLBs that would later be used to place the (F) rails. By this 
method, all the driver (input) pins and load (output) pins for 
CLB included in the blocking macro are disabled. Thus, the 
resource for the CLB block will not be used when routing 
the T part. This technique exclusively reserves the routing 
resource for the F logic, but it is not automated because the 
failed nets after 'sanity check [33]' need to be manually 
corrected. As well, dummy macros also need to be 
prepared, and implementation to different devices requires 
starting work from scratch. Another drawback is blocking 
the CLB means excluding all the T routing that preferably 
pass through these CLB blocks. This exacerbates the 
congestion in surrounding routing arteries. 
A routing repair technique is proposed in [16], which is 
specially used to search the non-identical routing pair or 
conflicting routing nodes, and repair them in an automatic 
manner. The precondition of this technique bases on the 
possible parallel placement between the dual rails of SDDL 
where swapped nets, which commonly exist in WDDL 
logic categories, are not used. However, the net pair of each 
compound gate in BCDL style needs to be synchronised in 
bundled cells. This, as well, complicates acquiring identical 
nets. Owing to the characteristics of block RAM, the repair 
work can be partially applied to the security-sensitive nets. 
3.3 Pre-place arrangement for BCDL 
The advantage of low fan-out BCDL countermeasure is that it 
can be applied at the RTL level, which makes it easier to 
move from one platform to another one. On the other hand, 
when the platform is fixed, routing techniques can be 
applied to improve BCDL. As demonstrated in [13], the 
reduction of fan-out improves the robustness of BCDL 
implementations. Whereas, low fan-out circuit still has 
some leakage present which can be exploited by a stronger 
attacker. In this work, we apply the identical routing 
technique to improve the security of a simplified AES core 
in low fan-out BCDL implementation. 
Low fan-out in block RAMs offer an opportunity to 
partially obtain parallel net paths between complementary 
networks. Implementing the T and F S-box in different 
BRAM provides parallel formats for the T and F S-box 
outputs. The synchronous clock controlling the BRAM 
outputs ensures glitch-free SubByte outputs. 
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Fig. 5 Placement of neighbouring BRAM in Xilinx Viriex-5 FPGA 
In this work, we choose the BRAM outputs (i.e. S-box 
outputs) as the target to repair, and also as the nets on 
which the attack will be done. In spite that a single BRAM 
in Xilinx Virtex-5 FPGA is sufficient to implement two 
independent S-box blocks, a couple of neighbouring 
BRAMs are chosen to locate the T and F S-box. In Xilinx 
Virtex-5 series, 20 CLB rows and 4 block BRAM are 
equally distributed in each clock region. As a view from 
FPGA-editor in Fig. 5, the neighbouring BRAMs have a 
distance equivalent with a width of five CLB-row in the 
applied FPGA. Since we use the BRAM to implement the 
S-box, the complementary output pair between the T and F 
BRAM also have the same distance to obtain parallel rails. 
The pre-place arrangement involves placing the 
corresponding output registers to the locations where all the 
complementary elements universally have identical 
distances. Xilinx placement tool, like PlanAhead, can easily 
fulfill this task. 
A simplified AES-co-processor is used as the testing core. 
Fig. 6 gives the architecture of the encryption core. It starts 
with an 8 bit XOR blocks, followed by an 8 bit S-box. The 
outputs of the BRAM are stored in registers. Encryption 
key is fixed to a specific value and all 256 possible inputs 
are fed using an LFSR. Since the biggest logic part S-box 
in the core part is implemented using a BRAM instead of 
logic elements, BCDL implementation of this core is 
mainly applied to the Bitxor operations (Fig. 7). The circuit 
runs on SASEBO-GII evaluation board. Side-chanel attack 
standard evaluation board (SASEBO)-GII has two FPGAs 
soldered on it: a Spartan-3 (XC3S50A) and a Xilinx 
Virtex-5 (XC5VLX30). Only the Virtex-5 FPGA is used to 
implement the crypto-algorithm. 
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3.4 Routing repair process 
The routing repair process is done using the repair tool 
presented in [16]. It detects the routing shapes of each pair 
of complementary nets. Once a non-identical net pair is 
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found, a repair mechanism is activated to repair non-identical 
nets in the process loop described in Fig. 8. 
The repair tool is constructed on RapidSmith [34, 35], which 
is a set of Java-based application programming interface (API) 
s, offering access to the low-level resources of the FPGA. This 
way, RapidSmith provides an easy way of building up specific 
purpose computer-aided design tools for Xilinx FPGAs. All 
process steps in Fig. 8 ((a) compare net shapes and find 
non-identical nets; (b) search conflict nodes; and (c) reroute 
the unrepaired nets etc.) are done automatically just by giving 
the unrepaired design in XDL format. Features offered by 
this tool are exploited in this work to reshape the target nets 
for obtaining identical T/F nets. The names of BCDL dual 
rails need to be modified so as to be recognised by the repair 
tool. This task can be done by a regular expression based 
script embedded into this customised tool. It is just needed to 
define the area parameters of the fabric where the unrepaired 
nets reside. After the repair process, the BCDL implemented 
8 bit dual-rail AES is obtained, which has identical T/F 
S-box output nets, as shown in Fig. 9. Wrapper part in this 
circuit represents the feeding logic, such as LFSR, and the 
drive logic to cyclically enable the encryptions. 
4 Security validations 
4.1 Investigation on prolonged nets 
As discussed in Section 2.2, block RAM implemented BCDL 
has the merits of low fan-out and less complexity, compared 
with most of other DPLs, and also has been proven to be more 
secure against side channel analysis. This higher security 
brings trouble to investigate variants for different BCDL 
schemes, since a very large number of samples is always 
needed, or being even impossible to be detected using 
normal equipment. According to author's experience, a pair 
of dual rails in parallel may yield very similar networks, 
albeit using vendor provided router if the nets are not 
densely routed. In this work, the testing circuit is quite 
small since S-box blocks have been embedded into 
BRAMs. The low network density brings similar net pairs 
that are discarded for comparison, since it does not 
represent the real scenario when a complete AES core or 
other complex algorithm is under testing, including dense 
networks resulting in non-identical T/F net pairs. 
Commercial routers make routing paths obtained to be 
different, even when equivalent routing resources are totally 
free. 
Owing to these observations, we intentionally strengthen 
the routing related EM side channel leakage by prolonging 
the target nets to have a better identification of the routing 
involved security factors. It facilitates the security check 
without weakening the fairness. The used routing scheme is 
presented in Fig. 10 - left. The S-box output nets are 
extended to the farthest corner in the Virtex-5 fabric. By 
this measure, we can have more obvious security 
identification because of the strengthened EM emanation 
arising from the use of long nets. The auto routed BRAM 
output nets are illustrated in Fig. 10 - right, in which the 
true nets and the complementary false nets have very 
different routing paths as it presents. 
4.2 CEMA test analyses 
In our work, CEMA is used to check the security 
improvement for the BRAM-based BCDL implemented 
simplified AES after the routing repair work. Measurement 
setup consists of a 54 855 Infiniium Agilent oscilloscope 
with a bandwidth of 6 GHz and a maximal sampling rate of 
20 G sample/s, antennae of the HZ-15 kit from Rohde & 
Schwarz. These antennae are able to capture very precise 
EM signals from the decoupling capacitor of the FPGA. 
Since there are several decoupling capacitors on the testing 
FPGA board that control different clock regions, the most 
suited one is chosen by trial-and-error methodology. Once a 
suitable capacitor is found traces for each input combination 
are acquired. The traces were acquired at a sampling rate of 
2 G sample/s for the simplified AES at 24 MHz clock 
frequency. The experiments are executed based on the 
following aspects: 
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Fig. 11 Asymptotic routing strategy 
1. Block RAM implemented BCDL poses exploitable 
leakage from the routing bias of security-sensitive parts. 
2. BRAM naturally does not behave as a leakage source, 
except the I/O pins [24], 
3. BCDL 'bundle' cell and synchronised T/F BRAM ensure 
no glitch and EPE in tested simplified AES block. 
4. We disable the connection to external output pins to 
eradicate the unfair strengthened EM emanation from metal 
solder balls on seating plane of the testing board. 
The testing work is executed in six phases: 
1. Setting the S-box output nets in Fig. 6 as target nets. Nets 
of bit [0-7] are converged to two extra LUTs; we hereby 
name them 'converge LUTs'. Therefore target nets do not 
need to be connected to external pins. This solution fairly 
guarantees that the target EM leakage is solely emitted from 
internal routings, but not strengthened by external on-board 
solder balls. 
2. We intentionally relocate the F converge LUTs to the 
farthest corner of the target Xilinx Virtex-5 FPGA, so as to 
have longer net paths and therefore yield stronger, but fair 
EM emanation from the target nets. 
3. Deploy the T converge LUTs into the clock region far away 
from the clock region where F converge LUTs resides, and 
then move to T converge LUTs to the clock region close to 
F converge LUTs step-by-step, as explained in Fig. 11. 
4. We set 14 consecutive steps for this asymptotic 
comparison. As the normal design, Xilinx tool is used to 
route all the nets, without considering the needs for net 
symmetry. 
5. Since T/F converge LUTs have the same distance as that 
between the T/F BRAMs in circuit_14, we can use the 
customised routing repair tool to obtain the circuit_15 with 
identical routing pair from circuit_14. 
6. CEMA attacks are launched, respectively, to all the 15 
circuits with 300 000 EM traces in each analysis. 
A snippet of the repair report from phase V is given below. 
According to the report, 8 bit BRAM output net pairs are 
non-identical. Since the extended nets pass through a section 
of the fabric which has plenty of free routing resource, only 
bitl, bit2 and bit7 need two loops to find proper identical 
routing paths for both T and F nets without conflicts. All the 
rest bits successfully find the routing path with just one 
repair iteration. This analysis can be further compared with 
the repair result in [16], where all the nets inside a crowded 
fabric are repaired and some net pairs need even six 
iterations to find a feasible path because of the routing jam. 
Asymmetric repair is starting: 
** Shape comparison is running 
0 T/F net pair are equal in shape 
8 T/F net pair are unequal in shape 
** List of eight asymmetric T net: 
asymmetric T nets are: ooo_dout_(7) 
asymmetric T nets are: ooo_dout_(0) 
asymmetric T nets are: ooo_dout_(l) 
asymmetric T nets are: ooo_dout_(3) 
asymmetric T nets are: ooo_dout_(4) 
asymmetric T nets are: ooo_dout_(2) 
asymmetric T nets are: ooo_dout_(5) 
asymmetric T nets are: ooo_dout_(6) 
** List of nets that are partially outside of the rectangle: 
total number of nets that are inside of rectangle: 8 
Repair iteration report 
** Successful**. 
** Successful**. 
** Successful**. 
** Successful**. 
** Successful**. 
** Successful**. 
** Successful**. 
** Successful**. 
There are 0 conflicting net(s) failed in repair. (Failed nets 
are kept unrouted!) 
Creating output file: top_repaired.xdl 
Time collapsed is: 4 s 
** Repair work is finished 
/o/ 
III 
111 
131 
141 
151 
161 
111 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
000. 
dout 
dout 
dout 
dout 
dout 
dout 
dout 
_dout_ 
-<6) 
-<5) 
-<1) 
-<0) 
-<3) 
-<4) 
-<7) 
-(2) 
Reroute iteration: 
Reroute iteration: 
Reroute iteration: 
Reroute iteration: 
Reroute iteration: 
Reroute iteration: 
Reroute iteration: 
Reroute iteration: 
Table 1 CEMA attacks with asymptotic routing schemes 
Attacked 
circuits 
Routing 
pair 
identical 
F converge 
LUT location 
T converge 
LUT location 
The key (hex) 
with highest 
correlation8 
Correlation value 
of highest key 
(x10"3) 
Rank position 
of the right 
key CC6') 
Correlation value 
of right key 
(x10"3) 
CircurM 
Circult_2 
Circult_3 
Circult_4 
Circult_5 
Circult_6 
Circult_7 
Circult_8 
Circult_9 
Circult_10 
Circult_11 
Circult_12 
Circult_13 
Circult_14 
Circult_15 V 
14 
14 
14 
14 
14 
14 
14 
14 
14 
14 
14 
14 
14 
14 
14 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
14 
'BV 
77' 
'2D' 
'94' 
'2A 
'D3' 
'04' 
'5A 
'70' 
'A2' 
'18' 
'56' 
'78' 
BO' 
'E2' 
82 
72 
71 
65 
66 
64 
59 
61 
70 
72 
69 
67 
66 
78 
68 
2 
4 
6 
8 
33 
32 
10 
40 
63 
38 
166 
167 
130 
67 
61 
59 
53 
46 
41 
51 
41 
37 
41 
24 
26 
27 
143 W 29 
174 > t
 2 2 
Higher the ranking position is, the easier the right key Is likely to be differentiated out 
aCEMA attacks: 300 000 EM traces/circuit (real algorithm key 'C6' (hex)). Descending rank positions show a rising difficulty to 
differentiate the right key 
We launched 15 CEMA attacks, respectively, on the 15 
circuits with different routing schemes. From the circuits 1-
14, Xilinx router is used to select the routing paths. Since 
vendor provided router finds the optimised short path from 
each path source to the path sink, the T/F path lengths are 
roughly obtaining closer by steps from circuit 1 to circuit 
14. We strictly adjust the T output nets without touching 
other parts of the circuit, and the comparison attacks are all 
done in the same testing environment, so we kept the effect 
from unexpected factors under the same level. 
In each attack, 300 000 EM traces are gathered under the 
same testing environments for each circuit. Table 1 
demonstrates the testing results. The ranking position of the 
correlation value for the right key 'C6' in all the 256 
possible keys are generally obtaining lower by step. The 
results indicate the routing impact for correlation attacks to 
A highlight view of 
/\f a pair of identical 
Fig. 12 Identical (balanced) T/F target nets are obtained after the repair process 
C¡rcu¡t_15 has the 
- ) lowest ranking 
position. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
No. of the 15 circuits with asymptotic routing schemes 
Fig. 13 Plot of the right key position in the correlation rank of all 256 possible keys 
the crypto-core, that is, more routing variants lead to easier 
right key differentiation from the rest key candidates. More 
precisely, two routings with similar lengths have similar 
parasitic capacitance. So, they compensate with each other 
better than net pair with bigger length variants in dual-rail 
compensation manner. It should be pointed out that the 
ranking positions for the right key do not show monotonic 
decrease. This is mainly because of the statistic feature of 
the measurements that cannot fully eliminate the random 
environmental factors which slightly impacts the analysis 
results. This effect can be minimised by significantly 
increasing the analysed traces. Although the results shown 
here are sufficient to present changing trend. 
Using the routing repair tool introduced in Section 3.5, 
circuit 15 is obtained by repairing the non-identical net pair 
of circuit 14 with precisely and fully identical T/F outputs, 
as plotted in Fig. 12. The same EM attack is done to circuit 
15, and the right hexadecimal key 'C6' ranks the lower 
position compared with the rankings from previous tests. 
The result reveals weaker correlation between the 
hypothetical leakage and actual measured leakages because 
of the improved compensation, as specified in Table 1. The 
right key ranking position among the 256 key candidates 
for the 15 circuits is plotted in Fig. 13, which demonstrates 
the observed general change trend. 
Even with positive experiment results, we note that these 
tests just show rough results because of the characteristic of 
statistics. Noise affecting the results from other factors 
cannot be fully eradicated. For instance, in some tests, 
ranking position of right key for circuit 15 varies might be 
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Table 2 Peak mutual information value for different output bits 
Architectures 
unrepaired 
repaired 
difference 
BitO 
0.043 
0.033 
0.010 
Bit 1 
0.048 
0.039 
0.011 
Bit 2 
0.053 
0.040 
0.013 
Bit 3 
0.013 
0.015 
-0.002 
Bit 4 
0.041 
0.028 
0.013 
Bit 5 
0.032 
0.013 
0.029 
Bit 6 
0.035 
0.029 
0.006 
Bit 7 
0.022 
0.017 
0.005 
Table 3 Net delays for T and F rails (upper two values) and time skew (lower value) comparison for the 15 described test circuits 
Number of circuits bitO_t bitOJ bit1_t bit1_f bit2_t bit2_f bit3_t bit3_f bit4_t bit4_f bit5_t bit5_f bit6_t bit6_f bit7_t bit7_f * Average abs_dif, ns 
abs_dif, ns abs_dif, ns abs_dif, ns abs_dif, ns abs_dif, ns abs_dif, ns abs_dif, ns abs_dif, ns 
Circuit 1 
Circuit 2 
Circuit 3 
Circuit 4 
Circuit 5 
Circuit 6 
Circuit 7 
Circuit 8 
Circuit 9 
Circuit 10 
Circuit 11 
Circuit 12 
Circuit 13 
Circuit 14 
Circuit 15 
2.873 7.733 
4.86 
3.079 7.733 
4.654 
3.097 7.733 
4.636 
3.782 7.733 
3.951 
3.824 7.733 
3.909 
4.000 7.733 
3.733 
6.059 7.733 
1.674 
6.58 7.733 
1.153 
6.393 7.733 
1.340 
6.78 7.733 
0.953 
6.669 7.733 
1.064 
6.963 7.733 
0.77 
7.543 7.733 
0.19 
7.317 7.733 
0.416 
6.059 6.056 
0.003 
2.609 7.451 
4.842 
3.317 7.451 
4.134 
3.57 7.451 
3.881 
4.051 7.451 
3.4 
4.501 7.451 
2.95 
4.498 7.451 
2.953 
4.186 7.451 
3.265 
5.448 7.451 
2.003 
5.227 7.451 
2.224 
5.373 7.451 
2.078 
6.155 7.451 
1.296 
6.511 7.451 
0.94 
7.105 7.451 
0.346 
7.106 7.451 
0.345 
6.814 6.814 
0.000 
3.412 7.370 
3.958 
3.708 7.370 
3.662 
4.683 7.370 
2.687 
4.918 7.370 
2.452 
5.793 7.370 
1.577 
5.794 7.370 
1.576 
6.292 7.370 
1.078 
6.408 7.370 
0.962 
6.641 7.370 
0.729 
7.155 7.370 
0.215 
7.952 7.370 
0.582 
7.707 7.370 
0.337 
8.772 7.370 
1.402 
8.975 7.370 
1.605 
7.549 7.539 
0.010 
3.572 6.929 
3.357 
3.585 6.929 
3.344 
4.88 6.929 
2.049 
4.971 6.929 
1.958 
4.937 6.929 
1.992 
5.316 6.929 
1.613 
6.158 6.929 
0.771 
5.868 6.929 
1.061 
6.953 6.929 
0.024 
6.808 6.929 
0.121 
7.747 6.929 
0.818 
7.142 6.929 
0.213 
7.127 6.929 
0.198 
9.907 6.929 
2.978 
7.415 7.409 
0.006 
3.434 9.118 
5.684 
3.147 9.118 
5.971 
3.938 9.118 
5.18 
3.547 9.118 
5.571 
3.841 9.118 
5.277 
5.345 9.118 
3.773 
5.808 9.118 
3.31 
6.058 9.118 
3.06 
6.739 9.118 
2.379 
7.352 9.118 
1.766 
7.505 9.118 
1.613 
7.971 9.118 
1.147 
7.101 9.118 
2.017 
8.25 9.118 
0.868 
10.553 10.553 
0.000 
3.694 7.308 
3.614 
3.963 7.308 
3.345 
3.888 7.308 
3.42 
3.907 7.308 
3.401 
4.221 7.308 
3.087 
4.062 7.308 
3.246 
4.562 7.308 
2.746 
6.087 7.308 
1.221 
4.968 7.308 
2.34 
6.551 7.308 
0.757 
5.776 7.308 
1.532 
6.271 7.308 
1.037 
7.504 7.308 
0.196 
7.149 7.308 
0.159 
10.655 10.656 
0.001 
3.44 8.706 
5.266 
3.785 8.706 
4.921 
4.505 8.706 
4.201 
5.065 8.706 
3.641 
5.299 8.706 
3.407 
5.443 8.706 
3.263 
6.016 8.706 
2.69 
6.583 8.706 
2.123 
6.909 8.706 
1.797 
6.175 8.706 
2.531 
7.594 8.706 
1.112 
8.5 8.706 
0.206 
8.826 8.706 
0.12 
9.024 8.706 
0.318 
5.889 5.889 
0.000 
3.694 9.013 
5.319 
3.678 9.013 
5.335 
4.036 9.013 
4.977 
5.302 9.013 
3.711 
4.862 9.013 
4.151 
5.715 9.013 
3.298 
5.714 9.013 
3.299 
6.375 9.013 
2.638 
7.1 9.013 
1.913 
7.548 9.013 
1.465 
7.71 9.013 
1.303 
8.26 9.013 
0.753 
8.868 9.013 
0.145 
9.84 9.013 
0.827 
6.292 6.291 
0.001 
4.613 
4.421 
3.879 
3.511 
3.294 
2.932 
2.354 
1.778 
1.593 
1.236 
1.165 
0.675 
0.577 
0.940 
0.003 
* Average abs-dif: absolute differences of the observed routing pairs are averaged in order to demonstrate the general decreasing net bias from asymptomatic routing scheme. 
a little higher than circuit 14. Thus, it is not sufficient to have 
stabilised conclusion. Accordingly, we resort to MIA to have 
further security verification. 
4.3 MIA test analysis 
Although correlation analyses (CPA or CEMA) are known to 
be very efficient for a given leakage model, MIA can 
sometimes outperform CPA if the hypothetical model is not 
precisely constructed because of the deficient knowledge 
about the target device or the unpredictable environmental/ 
device noise. In an ideal DPL circuit, the information 
leaked in the side channel is zero. Owing to the imbalance 
between the true and false parts in real implementation, 
some leakage is inevitably present. We assume this leakage 
to be slightly related to Hamming weight model given the 
construction of circuit and two-phase operation [13]. In this 
case study, MIA is preferably to be used since it can reveal 
weak information leakage and find both linear and 
non-linear dependencies between the model and leakage. 
Thus, MIA reveals minor dependence variants that CPA 
may fail to discover. 
To analyse the circuits 14 and 15 against MIA, the EM 
activity of the circuit is observed. Fig. 14 details the 
leakages plots from bit 2 and bit 5, respectively. X 
dimension in the plots shows the time of activity. Y 
dimension is the quantified mutual information. Red and 
blue curves show leakages from the unrepaired (circuit 14) 
and repaired (circuit 15) circuits, respectively. The 
information leak point resides around the sample point 600. 
A higher peak indicates more leaked information. It can be 
clearly observed that the repaired circuit leaks less 
information than the unrepaired one from the nets of the 
S-box output bits. The MIA plots of most other signals 
show similar results: less time skew leaks less information. 
The MIA comparisons for all the 8 bits are given in 
Table 2, which shows reduced information leakage for 
seven of these bits, with only an exception for bit 3. 
Compared with the CEMA analyses, MIA tests show stable 
results when comparing the security between the circuit 14 
and circuit 15. Since circuit 15 is directly obtained from 
circuit 14 by repairing the non-identical target nets without 
touching rest part, and both circuits run in the same testing 
environment, it is hence safe to conclude that it is the 
identical routing that contributes to the concrete security 
improvement. 
4.4 Further discussion 
Repair work exclusively operates on the target nets that are 
user defined without touching any other logic part. The 
result above can be further attested with the timing result in 
Table 3, where complete timing results for all the S-box 
output nets are extracted using Xilinx timing tool. The 
timing results show a reducing average net delay difference 
(indicated as Ave abs_dif) from circuit 1 to circuit 15 and 
generally matches the falling right key ranking position 
presented in Table 1 and Fig. 13. 
Comparison between the unrepaired (circuit 14) and 
repaired (circuit 15) circuits clearly represents the 
significantly decreased time skew between each T/F net 
pair. As given in Table 2, the S-box output nets from the 
unrepaired circuit 14 have an averaged time skew of 940 
ps. Comparatively, the time skew from the repaired circuit 
15 is merely 3 ps. It should be noted that even delay 
differences still exist in some net pairs after the repair 
process, it does not jeopardise the safety since such tiny 
time variants (maximal 6 ps in this test case) cannot 
practically be captured and differentiated by side channel 
measurements. It therefore guarantees the fairness of our 
verification. 
5 Conclusions and perspective for future 
work 
A major security obstacle for FPGA implemented 
SCA-resistant DPL is the routing bias between the 
complementary T/F nets. In this article, the security 
evaluation based on a simplified AES core in Xilinx 
Virtex-5 FPGA is systematically elaborated. Block 
BRAM implemented BCDL benefits from the low fan-out 
and EPE-free merits, and thus has good resistance against 
side channel threats. Thereby, since highly secure BCDL 
resists SCA from an upper level, it implies increasing the 
evaluation costs to figure out the security variations when 
improving the methodology. In this article, we specially 
strengthened the EM leakages from the routings under 
evaluations by intentionally extending the routing lengths. 
Owing to this measure, it is possible to easily and fairly 
evaluate the routing impact on the security resistance 
against CEMA and MIA attacks. Accomplished security 
validations are executed by two routing strategies: 
1. CEMA attacks are launched towards a series of circuits 
that reduces the routing bias using asymptotic routing 
scheme by Xilinx router. Testing results show that the 
circuits with less routing skew are fortified with better 
resistance against correlation analyses. 
2. A routing repair technique is adopted to reshape the 
non-identical routing pairs to obtain strictly symmetric 
dual-rail routing networks. Sophisticated MIA analyses 
display much less information leakage from the circuit with 
highly identical routing pairs. 
Timing analysis reveals significantly minimised time 
skew (from average 940 to 3 ps) between the 
corresponding T/F nets of target routings in this test case, 
which stabilises the results obtained in previous CEMA 
and MIA attacks. 
In the future work, we plan to have more sophisticated 
routing security evaluation by optimising the measurements, 
and improving the testing precision for nets without 
prolonging the length. 
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